Date: 26 Aug.'04
Dr. Donald L. Beggs, President
WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY
1845 Fairmount
Wichita, Ks 67260-0001
RE: The Empirical Effects of Collegiate
Athletics: An Interim Report
Additional Comments
Dear President Beggs,
This will serve to provide supplemental comments to my letter
review of the captioned matter of 16 Aug. '04:
I. General Comments RE Background Of the Report
It seems appropriate when reviewing any report, to question
the credibility of the authors and the motives for the studies and
report in the first instance.
On Sunday 8 Aug., coming back from a family reunion in western
Kansas, I stopped at Chili's for dinner and in the process of
eating read an article about the NCAA in a Friday 6 Aug. USA Today
paper. Since it was Chili's paper, I don't have a copy to cite,
but the article expressed the NCAA's desire and attempt to persuade
schools from trying to upgrade to Div. I-A football. Accordingly,
it occurred to me when I later started reading the captioned
report, that the NCAA may have commissioned the report attempting
to obtain a purportedly "independent" report making findings to
support the NCAA's attempt to dissuade Div. I-AA schools from
trying to upgrade to Div. I-A. It isn't necessarily so, but it is
a consideration. And, it does say something about where the NCAA
thinks its interest lies in Div. I-A football.
Next I would point out that if you really wanted an
"independent" analysis and report, why would you hire two of the
three folks doing the studies and writing the report, who are
apparently related: Jonathan M. Orszag and Peter R. Orszag? Are
the Orszags retained, either directly by the NCAA or indirectly
through Robert Litan, not only because of their ability, but also
because they are not likely to arrive at different analysis or
opinions, and with at least 2 of the 3 votes, can control the
report findings. Again, it isn't necessarily so, but it is a
consideration.
Then there is the stated fact that both Peter Orszag and
Robert Litan are Senior Fellows in Economic Studies at the
Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institute is a notorious
petrified mind liberal agenda think tank. For me, as a
conservative, that fact alone is sufficient to raise a red flag to
potentially question the deductive thought processes and
willingness to intellectually honestly present the data and
conclusions they draw from the data.
There is also the stated fact that both Orszags served in
government, Jonathan as the Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce
and Director of the Office of Policy and Strategic Planning, and
Peter served as Special Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy at the White House. These positions had to be under the
Clinton administration, as Bush would not use liberals associated
with the Brookings Institute. This is simply more evidence of,
acknowledgment of, and the use of, folks that constitute a state of
the art world class commitment to liberalism, and the liberal
agenda.
Then there is the admission contained on page 1, that the NCAA
guided the study, thus:
"The authors also thank ...; William Bowen, Robert Cumby,
William Gale, Michael Kremer, Andrew Zimbalist, and the
NCAA staff for helpful conversations and suggestions, and
Daniel Falks for his assistance with the survey and with
the NCAA/EADA data."
Additionally, the authors thank three "independent"
economists, none of which are identified. Why not? Are they all
also liberal think tank clones.
I am assuming that the NCAA became aware of Robert Litan, who
is stated to be Vice President for Research and Policy at the
Kauffman Foundation in Kansas City, when the NCAA offices were
located in Shawnee Mission, Kansas. And, since both Litan and
Peter Orszag are senior fellows at the Brookings Institute, I am
assuming the probability is that the NCAA contacted Litan, and
Litan brought the Orszags into the study contract. These folks
appear to be associated liberal network clones, hardly folks who
approach a subject matter with an open precision linearly deductive
thought prospective, unbiased by any liberal ability to justify any
preconceived prospective. Generally, liberals exhibit an ability
to not be much bothered by rational deductive thinking or existing
facts, if they conflict with their perception of where it is they
wish their conclusions to end up.
Then there is the stated fact that of the major data bases
used, the NCAA data base, and, says the report, p.2:
"[s]tatistical analysis of a new, comprehensive
database complied from school-specific information
collected as part of the Equity in Athletics Disclosure
Act (EADA) merged with data from other sources
(such as the Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data
System managed by the Department of Education);..."
(Emphasis added).
Any data managed by the Department of Education causes me some
concern, given my experience of calling the Department of Education
about Title IX, and being referred to their Office of Civil Rights.
I had reviewed the statute and had decided to call to request some
data and information relative to the statute. The first lady I
talked to was obviously young and I felt probably not able to
understand what I was talking about, so I shortly ask her if she
had a supervisor I could talk to. She said she would ring me in to
the Director of the Office of Civil Rights. When I talked to that
lady, I shortly determined she did not have the ability to even
consider my request. So, in the middle of trying to explain my
request to her, I stopped and asked her if she had an attorney in
her office who might better understand my request. She replied:
"No, we don't got no attorney here."
I then carefully had her write down the title of the report I was
interested in, and had her repeat it to me. She said she would
shortly send me the report, but I never received anything.
Moreover, because I was convinced of the marginal competence of the
Director of the Office, to say it kindly, I decided it was useless
to attempt to follow up with any letter or additional call, and
just forgot about it. These folks with jurisdiction over Title IX
in the Government, are fundamentally incompetent in my opinion.
Somewhere, in my prior correspondence to President Hughes, Fred
Sudermann, the football committee, etc, I have stated this
information of my experience with the Department of Education
Office of Civil Rights, but I have presently been unable to find it
on the computer. But the point is, with that background, it is
hard for me to place much confidence in any data managed by the
Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education.
With the above caveats in mind, I offer the following general
comments concerning the ten "Hypothesis" and Sections I-V. However,
none of the ten Hypothesis are relevant to the issue of the loss of
football causing the loss of students.
I. Hypothesis #1
The first four bullet points and the conclusion all provide
statements that constitute supporting rationale for the thought
process that the evidence of spending money on athletics at today's
level is a small 3 to 3.5 percent of total higher education
spending, and clearly not disproportionate or unjustified on the
basis of the share of overall academic spending. I would add, that
the beneficial effects of sports are synergistic, and accrue to the
benefit of academics.
II. Hypothesis #2
Please note that the inequality being discussed, is inequality
between schools, not inequality between men and women's athletics.
The conclusion might just as well say that: better programs did
better, earned more money, and accordingly had more money to spend,
and so invested their additional money to continue to grow their
programs.
III. Hypothesis #3
The statements and conclusion basically report the effects of
competition. The very good successful programs continue to be
successful precisely because they understand what it takes to
manage a successful program, and continue to manage and optimize
their chances for success. Schools that have less consistency
exhibit some mobility. When we had about a $1.0 million athletic
debt, we did not have substantive moral leadership, and the
leadership, making no serious effort whatsoever, announced we could
not raise one million dollars. But when we had substantive honest
leadership, we raised $3.2 million for the football stadium, about
$6 million for phase IV of the baseball stadium, and $26 million
for the round house project. Is there any surprise there can be
mobility in expenditure, revenue, and winning percentages in
football and basketball.
IV. Hypothesis #4
Says the report:
"Our statistical analysis suggest that between 1993
and 2001, an increase in operating expenditures of $1
on football or men's basketball in Division I-A was
associated with approximately $1 in additional operating
revenue, on average. The implication is that spending
an extra $1 was not associated with any increase or
decrease in net revenue, on average, from these sports."
(Emphasis in text and not supplied).
This statement says more to me about the attitude of the
report writers and the NCAA desire not to encourage Div. I-AA folks
to strive for Div. I-A, than it does about the substance of the
statement. The NCAA is satisfied with the status quo in Div. I-A
and the money they make from the big schools with quality programs.
There is no doubt that the Ohio State folks and other major
football powers, who strive for big bowl $12,000,000 payoffs,
ignore the conclusions of the report writers, and continue to
invest more money into their sports programs. In fact, the
reasonable discernment from the statistical statement, is not the
implication of the writers, presented as if were a negative, but
rather the implication is positive and a good thing. If you invest
an extra $1 in your program, you get the $1 back in extra revenue,
and you are building your base of support in the process. The
business community understands the principle of investing in your
business, product, and advertising, and use it regularly. In this
case, investing in the product and base is not even a loss leader.
You at least break even while expanding the program and your
support base. The writers know this and that is exactly why when
they put the matter in a negative fashion, their conscience
requires them to emphasis the word "net".
Moreover, universities are in a unique position in the
business world, because there are folks who will give them money if
they show proper leadership and support for athletic programs.
And, there are folks who wouldn't give a dime for academic
programs, other than through their state taxes, who, because they
are happy with support for athletic programs, will also contribute
to academic programs. This of course was the K-State experience,
candidly proudly admitted by a K-State professor in a national
article I have previously quoted.
In the last sentence of paragraph 2 of their findings, the
writers sheepishly admit, without further comment:
"It is possible that the effects of operating spending
differ from the effects of capital spending"
Absolutely so, and even more beneficial. See Koch, Geist, Devlon,
etc. contributions for the project on the roundhouse.
V. Hypothesis #5
Again, this Hypothesis is limited to "operating expenditures",
and does not consider the effects of capital expenditures. If we
had not solved the Cessna stadium problem for the benefit of the
community as well as the university, by raising $3.2 million and
saving the 30,000 seat stadium, we would have not created the good
will in the community that primed the pump for phase 4 of the
baseball stadium -- perhaps also not the softball stadium -- which
ultimately resulted in $26 million in gifts for Charles Koch arena.
And, accomplishing the Cessna stadium result against the initial
contra desires of president Hughes, was a major war, fought not
only inter se the community, and the then KU monopolistic
controlled Board of Regents, but even through the legislature. How
much more easily should it be to now accomplish a Div. I-A football
program, with all parties working together, and working from a base
of good will that presently exists from the results that have come
to fruition.
Please note the qualifying language of the findings, as
limited to "medium-term". Apparently, the relationship exists, but
you have to wait some for the results. Nor is medium-term defined,
except in the minds of the writers. But since we know that their
study was from between 1993 and 2001 data, a period of 8 years,
then medium term has to be less than 8 years, and I suspect the
relationship is exhibited within the 8 year period.
Moreover, what you spend the money on greatly effects whether
or not additional revenue is produced. Expending dollars to hire
a new coach like Bill Snyder for example, had a major effect upon
revenue, winning percentages, additional expenditures on capital
improvement of the capacity of wildcat stadium -- resulting in
additional revenues, alumni contributions to athletics, and
additionally to academics. All these issues are synergistic, and
these studies can not be legitimately isolated, except by ignoring
reality and applying mental gymnastics, which leads to
fundamentally flawed analysis and conclusions.
In this regard, as to bullet point two, they do "economic
exercises" and can't find an equation (statistical) relationship --
only because of their limiting assumptions, and their myopic
inability to consider reality that the great unwashed common man on
the street would find to be just plain common sense -- and so they
negatively assume no relationship exists. And I suspect they do so
in order to support the NCAA desire to discourage Div. I-AA
investment in football and basketball attempting to upgrade their
programs to Div. I-A. Of course, the NCAA knows that any such
finding will be ignored and have no effect upon the major football
programs in Div. I-A. The great unwashed would simply look at all
the major programs and find that the one thing they all had in
common was that they invested in their programs and facilities.
They wouldn't be able to write an equation and pseudo
intellectually make mental gymnastic paper talk, but they would
know the relationship exists, just like they know that they can
observe that the sun comes up every day, and so they believe it is
justified to conclude that it will come up tomorrow, even though
they can not write any equation to prove it. And, just because
they don't know how to write any such equation, doesn't mean that
they can be convinced the sun won't come up tomorrow. How does the
K-State experience fit the bullet point 2 statement? The answer is
that it doesn't.
VI. Hypothesis #6
The bottom line retort to bullet point 1, is that it probably
depends upon what the expenditures are for, and is probably
independent of the subset categories they chose. Bullet point 2
just says that it is possible to do either. The question is: what
policies and expenditures resulted in increased revenue for the two
schools, and what policies and expenditures resulted in loss by one
school. And, their conclusion is that the Hypothesis isn't proven.
In short, "We don't know".
VII. Hypothesis #7
One could probably surmise they had $1.21 worth of football
income, $1.14 worth of basketball income, and spent $1 on football,
$1 on basketball, and .35 cents on women, just to placate the
politically correct crowd on campus and the exhibited
intelligentsia of the Department of Education, Office of Civil
Rights, Title IX folks in Washington. But Title IX legally doesn't
say what those brilliant Title IX folks in Washington -- who tell
you over the phone: "No, we don't got no attorney here" -- say it
legally says. But then, education folks are immediately convinced
and will not challenge the politically correct folks and any such
high sounding words like "equity". "[t]o ensure equity". How is
it do you define "equity". To me it seems equitable, if women
spend the money they make for their programs. But that is way too
simple, as women programs could not exist at the level they do on
their own merit, but have to leach for their existence on the men's
sport programs to bring money into the athletic department. Nor
does Title IX say that dollar for dollar has to be spent for
women's programs, as is spent for men's programs. It is however
rational to conclude, from the statistical analysis presented in
bullet point 1, coupled with Hypothesis #4, that if you spend $1 on
football, $1.21 in football revenue will be obtained, of which $1
is spent on football and .21 cents is spent on women's programs.
Since women don't seem to be generally much interested in women's
sports, there are a few exceptions for basketball that I can think
of like SMS, Tennessee, Connecticut, and don't attend and support
the programs -- even though they control something like 80 percent
of the private money in the U.S. -- women ought to be happy with
the expenditure of a dollar on football, as it statistically
results in .21 cents being spent on women's sports.
Finally with respect to bullet point 1, I am not familiar with
the definition of "econometric". I think making up words or a
phrase is just fine, and a fun thing to do. I do it my self when
I can generate a descriptive thought process that drives home a
point. For example, many years ago I was reading a liberal article
that was so entirely false and devoid of rational thought
processes, that I became frustrated, quit reading, and started to
talk to myself trying to find words sufficient to properly describe
the lack of substance of the exhibited thought processes; when
suddenly my search engine spit out the phrase "mental
masturbation". I had never heard this phrase before, but I
immediately adopted it as descriptive, and if appropriately
applied, persuasive in making the point. A number of years later
I heard the Chicago Bears coach Mike Ditka (sp?) use the phrase on
the air in a television interview. If I was the inventor, it was
at least persuasive enough to travel to Chicago in some fashion.
So, I don't object to the invention of words or phrases, but since
I am not an economist -- neither do I suspect, are the NCAA
personal for whom the report was written -- and the word is not
self evident on its face, it would have been nice if the writers
would have troubled themselves to define exactly what it is they
meant by "econometric specification", for us great unwashed common
folks who are not economist.
However, the statement of bullet point 2, is supportive of
additional spending on football, as associated with increased
spending on women's sports. Those studies conclusions are
supportive of the implication that it could only happen if $1 spent
on football resulted in $1.21 in additional football revenue, .21
cents of which was then spent on women's sports. Since including
basketball, raises the number to .35 cents, apparently a $1 spent
on basketball only results in $1.14 cents additional basketball
revenue, and .14 cents additional being spent on women's sports.
But since it would not be politically correct to conclude that
women sports are benefitted with additional spending, by additional
spending on men's football or basketball, the writers hide behind
their nebulous subjective word "robust", and say the Hypothesis is
not proven, given the lack of "robustness". But $2.35 cents back
on $2.00 invested, or 17.5 percent profit in one year, seems robust
to me. The truth is at WSU, and most other schools, with some
exceptions for a few specific women's basketball programs; minor
sports -- I don't consider Baseball a minor sport -- have always
lived off of income from football or basketball.
VIII. Hypothesis #8
By using the word "measurable", they conclude if they can't or
don't want to measure it, it doesn't exist. But the K-State
professor was quoted in a national article as saying football
success at K-State had directly led to additional contributions to
academics.
It is to be noted that bullet point 1 says nothing about the
quantity of applicants. It only finds no relationship "either
positive or negative" re incoming SAT scores or the percentage of
applicants accepted. Further, higher SAT students probably pick
schools more for academic reasons, all other bases being relatively
equal. But if you don't have football, even some of these folks
may opt for a football school that is also academic. I had sports
interests long before I had developed academic interests, but I
chose WSU because it had the third best rated Aeronautical
Engineering School in the country at the time, behind only MIT and
Cal. Tech., and further it had the advantage of being able to stay
at home, and therefore more affordable for my folks. While at WSU
I never had any professor for my undergraduate degree or my masters
degree in engineering courses, that did not hold a doctors degree.
Further, I had two graduate courses in engineering that I took for
undergraduate degree credit. And, subsequently, in preparation of
expert witness testimony, I learned from Dr. Tetleman of UCLA, that
three courses he took for his doctors degree, elasticity, plates
and shells, and elastic stability, were all doctorate level
courses, which courses I took for my masters degree. I later
confirmed with Dr. Craig, that all three of the courses I had were
doctorate courses, but were taught at WSU at the masters level,
because we didn't have a doctorate in engineering at the time, and
they were the courses they were interested in teaching. So, even
though I chose WSU only for academic reasons that I knew about, if
my knowledge of the academics between schools had suggested they
were relatively equal, if WSU was then not seen as a traditional
university with traditional football, and given my athletic
interests, I might have chosen KU or K-State as in-state schools,
or some other out-of-state school with a quality aeronautical
engineering program, that also had traditional football. In truth,
the public perception of the quality of the education received at
an institution, is affected by the public perception of the quality
of the school's athletic programs, thereby affecting applications.
Notre Dame would still be a small expensive Jesuit school if it
wasn't for its football history. But we lose students from a
population base of 400,000, who go to K-State and KU although it
costs their parents more money, because the parents can not
successfully argue against allowing their children a traditional
college experience, including going to a university with a football
team and a traditional marching band and homecoming etc., even
though it would be cheaper and they would prefer it, if they have
the money to support going away to college.
IX. Hypothesis #9
When these writers use the term "robust", I'm convinced it
means they don't want to believe it or plead the case, probably
because they know the NCAA would consider it an inducement for Div.
I-AA school trying to upgrade to Div. I-A, for which it has been
publicly stated the NCAA wishes to dissuade; but it is measurable
and does exist. It is only by degree, that they contend the
Hypothesis is not proven. For example, our own local K-State
example, as stated by K-State interviews of president Jon Wefald
and a K-State professor in a national magazine, affirmatively prove
Hypothesis #9, and disproves bullet point 1.
X. Hypothesis #10
This Hypothesis is again unrelated to our postured question
and is concluded as not proven. But bullet point 4 states:
"It is important to emphasize that the existence of an
'arms race' may be concentrated in capital expenditures,
which are not adequately recorded in the NCAA/EADA data,
rather than in operating expenditures." (Emphasis added).
And, capital expenditures effect recruiting, therefore wining
percentages, attendance, income, and ultimately many other factors
that are synergistic and that additionally result in and produce
more of the same. The report writers know that capital
expenditures are extremely important and affect what they are
studying, but they don't have the data for capital expenditures,
and about all they can do is say our Hypotheses are not proven as
we don't have all the data we need.
XI. Section I
Empirical Literature
Note: At this point in the analysis I started to accomplish
the nine paragraph Section I analysis, when I got a automatic pop
up message on viruses that removed the document I was working on
from the screen. I deleted the virus message and was put back into
the menu, from which I selected my document and called it back to
the screen. I then accomplished a 9 paragraph analysis of Section
I, accomplishing about 6 or 7 pages in some 3 hours. I then
determined to eat lunch prior to starting Section 2, saved the
document and exited wordperfect 10 to the shut down mode, when I
noticed the bottom start button bar still had another word perfect
10 bar opened with a document. I could have continued to shut down
but I assumed the document still opened was the old document that
I did not want, so I deleted it, and then shut down to eat lunch.
When I returned I found that the document that was deleted was the
second document with some three hours of accomplished work, and
that I only had the original document available to start all over
with. I then expended some 3 hours working with trying to retrieve
the other document from the recycle bin and from the start menu
button without success. I have just finished working with my
computer expert who went through retrieval procedures and is
convinced I have overwritten the document and that it no longer
exists. The only solution is that I can try to re-sculpture my
original analysis. However, I already have brain damage just
thinking about trying to recreate the original analysis. Maybe
tomorrow I will be able to get over the brain damage sufficiently
to apply myself to trying to recreate the analysis, but it will be
truncated from the original analysis I am sure. Presently, I can't
even think about trying to recreate the analysis, its miller time.
XI. Section I
Empirical Literature
Notwithstanding the statements of paragraph 1, they like the
data anyway because they have nothing else, and they can even
better project what they want.
As to paragraph 2, they constrain their analysis to net
revenue. The authors write the paragraph in a negative fashion,
although neutrally saying that the studies find that changes in
spending on football or men's basketball are not associated with
significant increases or decreases in financial net revenues. But
folks in the business world spend money they consider to be a "loss
leader" expense, for advertising, price cuts, etc., in order to
attempt to expand the product base. For these purposes, they would
be happy to get a $1 back for every $1 invested, because they would
be in the process breaking even, not losing money, and would at the
same time be expanding the product base of supporters. With an
expanded base of support, there is simply more folks who can
potentially make gifts, buy the product, and make possible a more
profitable program in the long term. Investing a dollar, and
getting a dollar back in revenue, is a good thing, not a bad thing,
and ought to be accomplished at every opportunity.
Most importantly, if this process attracts more students to
the school, we have an advantage and opportunity most schools
nationwide do not have, and its called the tuition accountability
law. We get to keep the tuition for one year. And, the evidence
is we would have continued to grow in 1986 had not the KU Board of
Regents determined to kill WSU's football program and to relegate
WSU to a lesser status in the state system -- who's general
competition they didn't like in the first instance -- in a
irrational stated attempt to help K-State develop their football
program. Further, the KU Board of Regents determined -- in order
to stop K-State's precipitous loss of students because of the
negative national publicity of their then football program, said by
the NCAA to be the worst program in the history of collegiate
football, one victory in ten years in the Big 8, and to maintain K-
State in the then Big 8 conference, which conference was publicly
considering whether or not to kick K-State out of the conference --
it was necessary in the process of hiring Jon Wefald to charge him
with emphasizing football, and to stop the precipitous loss of
students. As a result we are some 8,000 students down from where
we could reasonably have expected to have been. Totally, some
$34,000,000 worth of one years tuition, over the years it would
take us to gain the 8,000 students. This money would clearly come
because we would then be seen as a traditional university, and the
windfall of the tuition accountability moneys we would be allowed
to keep, could be invested, at least in part, to endow the football
program. In reason, this is an economic business opportunity we
should not allow to be ignored or to otherwise pass up.
Moreover, the results of the $1 invested is probably like any
investment, a function of what it is you invest the money in. If
you use the money to invest in capital improvements, the results
will shortly be seen in the ability to recruit better players,
which will translate into better winning percentages, a larger
support base, and more revenue. The effects are synergistic, and
eventually cyclic and exponential. And, quality capital
improvements and more money invested in coaches salaries, attract
better game coaches who have the ability, and who hire assistants
with the ability, to recruit better players, resulting in higher
winning percentages, etc. None of these studies focus upon what
the money is invested in, probably because the data is not
available.
Nor do we need other studies to rely upon, when we have our
own direct experience. When our leadership determined to "suspend
football" in a quid pro quo agreement with the KU Board of Regents
for three doctors degrees in engineering, we had about a $1 million
athletic debt, and president Armstrong -- I am told, called a big
cigar and ask him to pay the $1, and he declined -- so based upon
his strident effort to raise $1 million, Armstrong publicly
announced we could not pay off the debt and so he was "suspending"
football, and then in less than 30 days announced that the
university had sold all the football equipment, before the
community had time to respond and raise the money. But when the KU
folks again tried to damage WSU and to assure that WSU would be
relegated to a lesser status in the state system, by trying to tear
down our football stadium, to preclude any future attempt to
reinstate football, this writer and Jim Meek went to the
legislature on overnight notice, argued against 6 KU folks arguing
to continue the language in the bill to tear down the WSU stadium,
before Gus Bogina's House Ways and Means committee, and were
successful in getting the language taken out of the bill.
Subsequently, president Hughes attempted to get the legislature to
put the language back into a bill, and this writer wrote an
analysis of Hughes' presentation to the legislature, and provided
it to the legislature. Subsequently, Fred Sudermann advised this
writer that he could not win the issue and that the legislature was
telling him that the president should set up a committee of
community leaders and solve the issue in Wichita, not the
legislature. Hughes then came around to saving the stadium, as the
KU Board of Regents backed off, and we then raised $3.2 million,
$2.2 of which came from the mil-levy, Cessna contributed either
$300,000 or $500,000, I don't remember for sure, and we renovated
Cessna stadium. When we finally got moral leadership, we raised
$3.2 million and renovated Cessna stadium. I suspect that
accomplishment led to Howard Wilkins Sr. contributing for the
women's softball stadium. Then, Hughes finally agreed to allow
Gene Stephenson to attempt to raise about $6 million for phase IV
of the baseball project, of which he was able I believe to raise
about $3 million. Enter then your involvement to fund the other $3
million, which has resulted in our present state of the art
collegiate baseball stadium. And, we were able to accomplish the
round house project when Charles Koch stepped forward with $6
million dollars of seed money, saying:
"I am now convinced WSU is headed in the right
direction."
The clear implication was we were not headed in the right direction
when the KU Board of Regents was trying to tear down Cessna
stadium. And Koch had all of our position papers, as well as 100
other community leaders. Nor did we ask Koch or any other
community leader for a dime or for their influence, in attempting
to save Cessna stadium for the community and the university. We
just supplied the community with the facts and knowledge of what
was going on, and let them make up their own minds whether they
agreed with our position or not. Eventually, when Koch was
convinced that the new leadership at the university was meritorious
and morally headed in the right direction, he stepped forward with
$6 million and the leadership that resulted in other major
community leaders contributing to the fruition of the project.
Bob Geist and Tom Devlon then contributed $2.5 million each
and you were then able to complete the $26 million dollar
renovation of the roundhouse, resulting in Charles Koch arena, an
unprecedented contribution to the university and this community.
Accordingly, we know what can be accomplished with moral
leadership, and trying to do the right thing. The Wichita
community responds. When we did not have moral intellectually
honest leadership, we could not raise $1 million dollars, so said
Warren Armstrong. But when we had moral leadership, we raised $3.2
million of mostly non private money; accomplished the softball
project; raised $6 million and accomplished the baseball project;
and then raised mostly $26 million dollars of private money and
accomplished the Charles Koch Arena project. Clearly, we don't
need to look to nebulous outside studies of other folks, when we
have developed our own abilities to accomplish major projects to
the great benefit of the university, and have our own past
experience to rely upon and give us confidence with which to
proceed to solve our problem of our inability to attract and grow
a larger student body because we are not seen as a traditional
university, as we have no football program. We are not like K-
State in 1986, with the worst football program in the history of
the NCAA, we are worse. We have no football program, none, nada,
non compos mentis: resulting in no marching band; a reduced music
school that used to be recognized nationwide; lost students; the
inability to grow students; a non-traditional university image to
sell to prospective students; as well as less prestige with the now
depacked Board of Regents, resulting in our continuing inability to
obtain our fair share of the State education budget, as clearly
evident by the substantially lesser statistical per capita state
spending on WSU students vis-a-vis KU and K-State students.
And this is so with respect to KU, even if you do not consider
the KU medical school budget, which as I recall was $311,000,000
dollars in 1995 -- including the WSU medical school the KU Board of
Regents stole, excuse me, transferred, but that's another
injustice, and I need to concentrate on one at a time -- and half
of the KU total budget, which KU budget was then I believe from
memory of studies I have accomplished in about 1995, was about half
of the total state education budget. For this $311,000,000/yr in
1995, KU graduated 54 doctors, of which 8 percent annually, or
about 4 doctors in 1995, stayed in Kansas. Lets see, $311,000,000
divided by 4 ... well, you get the idea. We could buy more doctors
than 4, for $311,000,000/yr.
Nor is there any evidence that I am aware of, that the Board
of Regents is profoundly concerned with the lack of equity to WSU,
as measured by per capita state spending on WSU, KU and K-State.
And they have certainly professed no concern publicly for the
problem of loss of students at WSU that they themselves caused, by
the then KU monopolistic controlled Board of Regents, and the quid
pro quo agreement to "suspend" football at WSU. The Board of
Regents was profoundly concerned with the status of K-State's
football team and the associated precipitous loss of students
because of that status and national image; but they care not a wit
that we have no football program at all, that their predecessors
insidiously, deceitfully, and with chicanery, killed WSU's football
program and caused WSU's loss of student problem. Is the Board of
Regents interested in solving the WSU student loss problem? From
public evidence, the answer is, not hardly! They are more than
happy to see Wichita students go to KU and K-State.
Notwithstanding Sedgwick County pays more taxes to the state than
any other county, including Johnson County, Sedgwick County
taxpayers are not treated with equity re per capita state spending
on education, and further not only have to disproportionately fund
education at KU and K-State, but also have to send their children
to KU and K-State, at additional housing and living costs, in order
to afford them a traditional university educational experience, and
in order to obtain a more prestigious degree from a recognized
traditional university with a traditional football program.
The second to last sentence of paragraph 2, states:
"Zimbalist (1999), relying on aggregate data published
by the NCAA, notes, 'Since it is only the top IA
schools that generate significant positive net income,
it is not surprising that new arrivals to the big time
do not flourish financially." (Emphasis added).
This statement seems to be more evidence that the NCAA is trying to
dissuade Div. I-AA schools from trying to upgrade to Div. I-A.
Finally in the last sentence of paragraph 2, the authors
admit:
"It is important to note that none of these studies
found that expanding athletic programs causes a
significant reduction in net revenue." (Emphasis added).
That finding is supportive of our re-instituting our football
program.
With respect to paragraph 3, their finding of previous
studies, is limited to a statement constrained by the word "net"
revenue. And, of course, none of these studies consider
expenditure upon capital improvements. As stated above, a $1 in
and a $1 back, is a good thing, as it expands the base, and the
potential for future income.
In paragraph 4, the authors recognize indirect effects. They
have no studies measuring indirect effects, but they know they in
fact exist. Says paragraph 4:
"Such indirect effects come in two quantifiable forms:
indirect financial effects and indirect non-financial but
nonetheless quantifiable effects ... In addition, there
may be non-quantifiable effects (e.g., effects on school
spirit), which by definition are difficult to examine
in an empirical fashion but may manifest themselves
indirectly through quantifiable factors (e.g.,
applications)."
We already have a local Kansas example, re alumni donations, of the
quote from the K-State professor in the Sports Illustrated article,
that there was a positive synergistic effect from the K-State
football success, resulting in increased academic contributions.
And, we have our own example which includes even non-alumni
contributions. When we had moral leadership trying to do the right
thing, we raised $26 million, of which $6 was from Koch and $2.5
million each was from Geist and Devlon. ... I suspect there are
folks with significant amounts of moneys, who are WSU graduates,
and who may not care much about football; but if approached on the
basis of solving our student loss problem and becoming a
traditional university again, might well be interested in helping
out the cause.
And as to quantifiable effects of increased applications
acknowledged by the report writers, the positive effect upon K-
State and the negative effect on WSU resulting in a delta increment
of 8,000 students over the 18 year time frame; resulted from the
institution of the exact opposite policies.
With respect to paragraph 5, and alumni donations, 11 studies
are cited, with 7 of the studies being positive in findings that
athletic success increases alumni donations, 2 are neutral, and 2
are negative. And, I suspect the negative folks started with an
agenda.
As to paragraph 6, they don't define what they mean by
"variation" in won/lost records. Do they mean that if the winning
percentage went up, that donors contributed less to general
purposes. At K-State they didn't. The effect was synergistic, and
contributions to academics went up. And, if they mean that if the
winning percentage went down, that the contributions to academics
also went down -- a negative effect -- then most folks would expect
that to be the case. But then the authors admit:
"[t]he share of graduates who make gifts specifically
for athletics is not affected by athletic success, but
amounts given to athletics are positively affected...
Shulman and Bowen (2001) find no evidence that gifts
to athletics crowd out gifts to general university
funds." (Emphasis added).
Please note our experience, graduate or not, that it only takes one
Koch, Geist, Devlon, Coulter, Wagnon, Carney, etc. to significantly
impact a program, and amounts given to a program, even though the
total number, "share", of contributors remain about constant.
Nor should the faculty get piggish about it. Its not their
money. The faculty who preen themselves and look down their nose
at us great unwashed common tax payers, who fund education and
their salaries for teaching one or two three hour classes and
working about 10 hours a week total, (We twice hand delivered a
position paper to 55 faculty senate members between 2 and 4 p.m.,
as I recall, once on a Thursday and once on a Friday, and found
only 5 professors, 3 on one day and 2 on another, 5 total for both
days, in their offices available for student consultations); are
not owed any additional obligations beyond state taxes to fund
education. It's the money of the individual members of the
community, who can do with their money what they want, beyond
taxes. So we shouldn't have to listen to any faculty carping that
if we reinstitute football it will somehow accrue to less money for
them.
Note: To understand what it is we have been confronted with
and had to deal with from the faculty in the past, just in case the
faculty might cause concern, you might want to review a March 23,
1995 letter from the then president of the faculty senate, Joyce
Cavarozzi, containing the following statement:
"As teachers, faculty know how easy it is to
reach wrong conclusions when one is not fully
informed."
To which the 11 page retort to M?s Cavarozzi was supplied by this
writer on March 30, 1995. President Hughes was copied on the
letter, as well as 55 members of the faculty senate, the W.S.U.
Board of Trustees, the W.S.U. student senate, selected community
leaders, etc. I can provide copies if you wish to review them and
Julia can't find them in the president's (Hughes at the time)
files.
As to paragraph 7, "Athletic success may also affect
application and enrollment", I would refer to my initial analysis
comments which dealt with this paragraph, the Goff (2000) report,
and the related statement on page 31.
With respect to paragraph 8, after first having to admit that:
"[t]he evidence is that athletic success increases applications",
the authors then give away their bias, by changing the subject to
talk about "academic quality". They don't like to discuss the
positive results of increased students, so they change the subject
and discuss their inability to determine whether or not there is
any affect upon "quality". Further, the statements concerning
other reports are subjective as to what the other reports purport
to say, with the other reports themselves remaining nebulous,
undefined, and undisclosed as to the definitive bases for their
study and analysis. We are just presented cites to the reports
together with these authors subjective conclusions. Which
conclusions in paragraph 8 are in any case not definitive re
athletic success vis-a-vis "quality" of applicants.
As to paragraph 9, Rishe's finding that a $1 increase in
football net revenue is associated with $.20 increase in
expenditures on women's sports; and Sheehan's finding that $1
increase in football net revenue raises women's expenditures by
$.32 and other men's expenditures by $.13; and Sheehan's additional
finding that increases in expenditures on women's sports are
associated with a reduction in net revenue from women's sports; in
reason, argues that the best benefit, including benefit to women,
is accomplished by investment in football. Paragraph 9 accordingly
is evidence supporting our reinstatement of football, as we could
expect additional moneys to also benefit women's sports and other
men's minor sports.
XII. Section II
Description of Data
The authors attempts to put together a sufficient database
seems to be reasonable. But the authors' admission concerning the
data base, should be noted:
"The construction of the database revealed numerous
inconsistencies both across and within various data
sets... The resultant database, although an improvement
relative to previous data efforts in this area, clearly
has important limitations that are discussed in more
detail below."
XIII. Section III
Basic Facts about Athletic Spending
This section is interesting as it exhibits a gleed fact that
the percentage of operating athletic expenditures as against
overall higher education spending, does not shock the conscience.
(See Table 1). 2.8 percent as against total university spending
and 3.6 percent as against education and general spending, is no
more than we usually pay the faculty for their annual cost of
living raises and also less than us great unwashed taxpayers
usually pay the faculty for their annual automatic -- excuse me,
merit -- raises, which are given for teaching the same course, from
the same notes for each of the last 10 years, to perhaps state the
case somewhat strongly. So, the point is, that the faculty have no
standing as to our private money, and ought not to be heard re our
public money, as long as we aren't taking their tenure away from
them, or requesting them to contribute a percentage of their salary
to reinstitute football; justified on the basis that without
additional students for them to teach, we might have to WU-Shock
scythe and permanently furlough a few of the more egregious
preeners. God forbid that they might then have to take a job at a
traditional university with a football team.
Also interesting is the last full paragraph on page 14. One
could opine that smaller schools, particularly Div. II and III,
have to pay a higher percentage of athletic spending vs total
educational budget, either because their athletic programs are not
quality, are not attractive, and are not well supported, or because
the school's total budget is of lesser status, percentage-wise.
One could also opine that smaller Div. I, and Div. II and Div. III
schools, don't have the prestige to obtain larger overall budgets,
in the face of competition from more prestigious schools with
quality athletic programs. Miami, is a fine example of a small
school, 6,000 + students, that I believe is a private school, that
has prospered financially in athletics by investing in its football
team and winning five national championships. Are there many folks
nationally that view Miami as a small urban commuter school? -- not
hardly.
With respect to growth in athletic programs, exhibited on page
15, I would suggest a variation of Parkinson's law (found on p.
398-399, Dictionary of Theories), that athletic spending and
program growth expands to fill the additional available dollars for
expenditure. So the effect is synergistic. Athletic program
success, attracts additional available dollars, which wisely
invested in the product, broadens the base, and attracts additional
support and further additional dollars for expenditure. (Say,
isn't it fun to play with the Dictionary of Theories for laws,
principles, theories, and 'ism's, as they imply and generate
rationale and thought processes, for not only the matters they
directly deal with, but as they suggest application even to
unrelated matters).
With respect to Figure 2, and the first full paragraph of page
16, I suspect the result of the decline in spending in men's sports
other than football and basketball, is directly a function of
increased spending on women's sports. But as previously exhibited
by the report, the increased spending on women's sports occurs
precisely as a result of increased spending (wisely invested) in
football and basketball, that has produced addition revenue
available to be spent on women's sports. Broadening the base at
WSU by re-instituting football can, by the reports statistics and
findings, only accrue to additional money being available for
expenditure on women's sports.
As to the issue of "Inequality in football spending", the
obvious should be stated. The rich get richer because they learned
how to get rich in the first instance, and so wisely keep investing
in the process that is successful. Once the syllogism is
established and learned, there is no reason not to apply it again.
The better programs earn more money and can thereafter, by Marrs'
variation of Parkinson's law, wisely investing in the product, earn
and spend additional moneys on the program. The top 4 bowls pay
about $12,000,000 to each team. Other bowls pay 1-3 million or
less. This finding of inequality (Note: not inequity -- a lack of
equity, injustice, or unfairness -- but rather simply a condition
of being unequal), should be expected to continue as the better
programs will earn more money, spend more money, recruit the better
talent, and continue to have the better teams. But once in a while
a bottom school will make a commitment like K-State, and over a
period of time, will work its way up the ladder to the top, as K-
State has.
And the report on page 18-19, Table 3 identifies and suggests
a moderate degree of mobility in football spending over a period of
8 years.
Figure 5 exhibits that mean expenditures on Division I-A
basketball has increased since 1993, and the report concludes that
spending inequality in men's basketball has risen significantly
since 1993. I suspect that WSU will soon be a major contributor to
future inequality studies, as we have invested in Charles Koch
Arena which will result in better recruiting, a higher winning
percentage, more folks going to games, more income to the program;
all of which will allow for more investment -- hopefully wisely in
a manner to improve the program -- expenditures on the basketball
program, as well as probably resulting additional expenditures on
women's and minor men's sports.
I am enclosing a copy of my marked up page 20, as I have
superimposed Figure 3 mean expenditure numbers for Div. I-A
football, on the Figure 6 mean revenue numbers; and then calculated
and superimposed the percentage of mean expenditures over mean
revenue numbers for the same time periods. The interesting result
is that the ratio of mean revenue to mean spending remains stable
over the time period from 1993 to 2001, at about 60 percent. I
would submit that this comparison of known data, with institutional
support subtracted, proves that Div. I-A football is profitable.
Expenditures are only 60 percent of income. I would also
specifically note the report's statement in the last paragraph of
page 20, that:
"[r]evenue from football increased (in inflation-adjusted
terms) by more than a third between 1993 and 2001 (Figure
6). As with spending, there appears to have been an
acceleration in revenue in the late 1990s: In the four
years between 1993 and 1997, real football revenue rose
by six percent; in the four years between 1997 and 2001,
revenue rose by 28 percent." (Emphasis added).
Please note the apparent interrelationship between spending and
revenue. As spending goes up, so did also the revenue, which
allowed for more spending, while the ratio or percentage of
spending to revenue remained approximately 60 percent. Most
importantly, "between 1997 and 2001 (for which years they presently
have data) revenue rose by 28 percent." In the stock market world,
folks would consider this to be a good investment. I would submit
that these numbers suggest that now is a very attractive time to
invest in a football program.
From paragraph 1 on page 21, it is apparent that the adjusted
data exhibited in Figure 7, is the worst case scenario. I would
note that the report states that about 67 percent of both football
and basketball programs in Div. I-A reported positive net revenue
(62 percent using adjusted net revenue for football) for 2001.
This emphasizes where the money comes from to support other sports
programs. Footnote 15 confirms that schools don't always have
positive net revenue and don't always have negative net revenue.
They go up and down, probably depending upon the quality of their
programs, and football and basketball teams. To maintain positive
net income, a school needs to invest wisely and maintain winning
football and basketball teams. It seems like most other
competition in society, which we should not quail in the face of or
go wobbly about.
XIV. Section IV:
The Effects of Athletic Spending
This entire Section seems bent on supporting the NCAA's desire
to particularly discourage Div. I-AA and I-AAA schools from
attempting to upgrade their athletic programs, and particularly
football competition, in face of admitted evidence to the contrary.
Admits the report:
"Indeed, looking across Division I-A in 2001, schools
that spent more on football tended to have higher levels
of net revenue from football than schools that spent less
on football (Figure 8)." (Emphasis added).
With respect to bullet point "Indirect costs", on page 23,
what in fact constitutes an indirect cost? Anyone who has
endeavored to review school budgets, and I must admit to the sin,
understands the magic ability of accountants, for which abilities
I hold in the highest regard. Rober Lowe -- darn, I did it again.
Sudermann should have never told me that story -- [sic] Roger Lowe,
is world class. Query, does the time some school administrator
like Ted Ayres spends considering some athletic related issue
constitute for accounting purposes, an indirect cost to athletics
-- I make no comment as to whether it should or shouldn't.
Apparently, schools vary all over the spectrum on these kind of
issues, which makes the data a little difficult to discern, to
understate the problem.
Figure 9 and the associated paragraph on page 24, are argued
in nebulous subjective terms so that the authors conclusions are
legitimately suspect. How is the word "expanded" defined? How so,
how did they expand their program? The answer is apparently: "by
larger amounts". So, the real issue is then, what did you spend
the money on? And, of course, these folks don't know. But it is
impossible to substantively judge the statement without knowing
what the money was spent for. Then they conclude, that they:
"[d]id not enjoy increases in net revenue that were
larger (in a statistically significant sense) than
schools that expanded their football programs by
more modest amounts." (Emphasis added).
Please note the necessity for the conclusion, of the undefined
subjective word "modest". More importantly, the necessity for the
conclusion of the subjective prepositional phrase "in a
statistically significant sense", contained wholly in the mind of
the authors. But the phrase itself suggests that the necessity of
the phrase is required in order to allow the conclusion, and
suggests by implication that, in fact, they enjoyed increases in
net revenue that were larger than schools that did not expanded as
much as measured by the amount of dollars spent; only just not
statistically significant in the minds of the authors.
And, the authors then admit, citing Appendix I data, that on
average, $1 additional expenditure results in an addition dollar of
football revenue, as follows:
"The results suggest that, on average, each additional
dollar that a Division I-A university spends on football
is associated with roughly one additional dollar of
football revenue -- so football net revenue is unchanged.
In other words, an inflation-adjusted increase in
football spending of one dollar was associated with
roughly one additional dollar in football revenue between
1993 and 2001." (Emphasis added).
A dollar invested and a dollar back, is a good thing, particularly
if the initial dollar is a contribution gift. But the conclusion
I draw is that the authors are stridently struggling to support the
NCAA's desire to discourage Div. I-AA and I-AAA schools from
upgrading their football programs, or even to discourage lessor
Div. I-A schools from competing with the larger most profitable
football schools for which the NCAA is in league, probably as a
result of TV income. Hence the need by the authors to qualify
their required supporting statements for the NCAA's benefit, by
subjective word game playing.
But while the results quoted above for Appendix 1 data, are
positive, even then the equation seems to measure the expenditures
and revenues, for only the year t. But what if spending is in year
t, say for capital improvements which they apparently don't
measure, or even for any other expenditure that they do measure;
that results in additional revenue in year u, some time down the
road, beyond the 8 year period reviewed? And they have already
admitted in Figure 6, p. 20, that while football revenues increased
in the first four years from 1993 to 1997 by 6 percent, for the
four years between 1997 and 2001 they increased 28 percent, which
increases are non-linear. Accordingly, what the data will indicate
for the four years between 2001 to 2005, should be very interesting
as to what folks accomplish, given their experience and profit
between 1997 and 2001. If the increases would have been linear,
they would have been expected to be 12 percent for the four years
1997-2001.
Further as to Figure 9, p.24, if a vertical line is drawn, so
that the change in football expenditure is zero, only 10 schools of
the some 76 schools considered in Figure 9, in the eight year
period will be seen to have reduced football expenditures, 7 of
which only slightly. Perhaps that is because $1 additional
football expenditure is $1 additional revenue, or is it $1.32 as
found by Sheehan (2000), paragraph 9, page 12.
Nor are the three bullet examples for significant direct
financial returns, and the three bullet examples for nominal
reduction, anecdotal evidence; persuasive in my mind as to the
authors' gymnastics word playing in order to support the NCAA's
requested position. And I am hard headed about it -- as you know
I don't believe the NCAA is pure as the driven snow. For example,
the unwillingness to disclose the full RPI equation and factors.
The WAC example is couched in terms of "fell in nominal
terms". What is the magnitude of such "nominal terms"?
The one school in The Conference USA example identified
expenditure of only $250,000 per year over four years. For most
programs, this would not be considered a significant yearly change.
Nor is there any explanation of what the money was spent for.
Maybe Ted Ayres got an annual merit raise, and Roger Lowe
attributed it to football expenditures, just to make the point, ad
absurdum, of how much we potentially don't know about the data that
is available. But it seems embarrassingly obvious, that while it
may be gymnastically interesting, these are not exactly,
necessarily, definitive analysis. It might even be more
appropriate, to step back, and take a general look at how all these
schools nationally continue to annually conduct programs, and
reasonably conclude that it is successfully accomplished, ergo it
can be accomplished, so lets use our intelligence and work the
problem, probably by selling the program on the basis of our need
to grow our student body, and the windfall tuition accountability
unique benefit of some potential $34 million we can obtain if we do
so.
And, the Mountain West school example is presented as a
negative, apparently for the reason that the increase in revenue
was less than the investment. It was however, not a decrease in
revenue, and, depending upon the investment, the question remains
as to whether the revenue increase will continue beyond the four
year period, should the investment stop, which data is unavailable.
But even then the authors are forced to admit:
"Similarly, some schools benefitted from moving up
to Division I-A, but the experience varied across
schools. For example, two schools earned significant
financial returns after moving to Division I-A; one
experienced a decline in football net revenue after
moving to Division I-A." (Emphasis added).
Again, what did the one school spend its money on when it moved to
Div. I-A? And, note, they qualify the decline as net decline,
which doesn't mean they had a decline in revenue overall, but just
a decline relative to the net revenue they experience prior to
upgrading to Div. I-A. And, the magnitude of the decline of net
revenue is unstated.
By Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c, the authors suggest some degree of
mobility in winning percentages. The statement: "The correlation
of winning percentages two years apart is 33 to 51 percent.", on
page 27 for Table 5a, is a true statement; but really is not as
definitive as it could have been. When looked at sequentially, the
numbers are: 1993-1995, 51 %; 1995-1997, 44 %; 1997-1999, 33 %; and
1999-2001, 38 %. So, while the stated range is correct, it seems
more important to state that the trend seems to be down. The trend
was down from 1993 to 1999, being from 51 % to 33 %, although the
following two years has seen the percentage go back up to 38 %. Is
the upward movement the last two years from 33 to 38 percent the
starting of a new upward trend, or is it just a slight aberration
in an overall downward trend? In any case, I agree with the
authors that there seems to be some degree of mobility in winning
percentages. I suspect this to be expected as the study is looking
at all Div. I-A schools, so that on the average I would expect
"mobility" in winning percentages. That is not to say however,
that the upper echelon of schools don't continue to win, and the
lower echelon of schools don't continue to be on the losing side,
probably because of continuing policies, procedures, and acts, of
the leadership of both categories.
For Table 5b the authors state they do not present the
correlation beyond 20 years: "[b]ecause the correlation appears to
be relatively stable as the time horizon lengthens." Apparently,
subsequent to 20 years the correlation flattens out and remains
about 16 percent. Enclosed is a graph of the data of Table 5b,
which exhibits that the data is a smooth non-linear curve,
asymptotic to 100 percent as required by definition, and apparently
also almost asymptotic to 16 percent. However, since the time
period of the data looked at is stated to be from 1955 to 2001, 46
years, and since the authors state they do not exhibit the results
beyond two decades because of limited data, I am assuming the data
plotted represents data for the last 20 years, from 1981 to 2001.
If this is so, a comparison of the truncated data for just 1993-
2001, provides the curve exhibited for Table 5a. Note, the
truncated more recent data is not asymptotic. The question then
is: does this more recent data indicate a trend towards greater
correlation of winning percentages? Subsequent data may answer the
question, but presently, I'm not able to make any definitive
conclusion. If you relate the correlation of decade averages of
winning percentage, sequentially back 10 years, as exhibited in
Table 5c, starting between 1965-1974, between 1975-1984, and
between 1985-1994, it is seen that the progression is 42%, 55%, to
59%. And, if you relate the correlation of decade averages of
winning percentages, sequentially back 20 years, starting between
1975-1984, and between 1985-1994, it is seen that the progression
is 30% to 49%. So there may be some indication of a trend towards
greater correlation of winning percentages. But I would still have
to see more recent data to make any conclusion.
As to the presented issue of a potential "arms race", the
authors observation of the data concluded that any such existence
is unproven. Further, since WSU has not had a football team for
the last 18 years, we obviously have not been involved in any "arms
race". Obviously, no one at any other university has spent any
money on football to compete with WSU's lack of a football team,
but they have enjoyed the benefit of additional students because of
a lack of a football team at WSU, to wit: KU and K-State.
The issues of "Other quantifiable effects", on page 31, I have
dealt with in my prior analysis letter.
XV. Section V
Conclusions and Next Steps
It is unnecessary to reiterate the issues presented in
Section V Conclusions, and I will rather rely upon the prior
analysis, and the exhibited analysis above.
XVI. Conclusion
I should first thank you for your indulgence in the few
attempts at humor above. One of my excuses is that after having to
recreate XI. Section I from memory, without any prior notes of
issues and items of rationale, I suffered such brain damage from
attempting to recreate 6 or 7 pages of analysis, that I just
naturally rebelled from the process, needed some relief, and so
allowed myself the freedom to wonder from my normal need to stay
focused on specific issues. Nor was Section I successfully
recreated, as I am confident some elements were added and some were
left out, and so Section I was in some respects, a new drafted
section.
It is however our hope that the effort presented in our prior
analysis letter, and the above analysis letter, will be of benefit
to your consideration of the captioned Interim Report on The
Empirical Effects Of Collegiate Athletics. It is further our hope
that our analysis letters sufficiently dispel any notion, and
defrock any previous advice, you may have received that the Interim
Report is authority against any attempt to reinstate football at
WSU. As we have presented, the Interim Report can in fact be cited
in support of reinstating football at WSU, including specifically
the loss of students and inability to grow students over the last
18 years.
In appreciation of your consideration of the above, we are
with,
Kind regards,
Shocker Black & Golds
By:
Fred Marrs
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